Bad, Mad or Sad? Legal Language, Narratives, and Identity Constructions of Women Who Kill their Children in England and Wales by Siobhan Weare
Bad, Mad or Sad? Legal Language, Narratives,
and Identity Constructions of Women Who Kill their
Children in England and Wales
Siobhan Weare1
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this article I explore the ways in which legal language, discourses,
and narratives construct new dominant identities for women who kill their children.
These identities are those of the ‘bad’, ‘mad’, or ‘sad’ woman. Drawing upon and
critiquing statutes, case law, and sentencing remarks from England and Wales, I
explore how singular narrative identities emerge for the female defendants con-
cerned. Using examples from selected cases, I highlight how the judiciary interpret
legislation, use evidence, and draw upon gender stereotypes in carefully con-
structing macro-narratives which produce gendered identities for filicidal women,
thus nullifying the challenge these women pose to appropriate femininity and the
motherhood mandate. Each of the narrative identities discussed deny the agency of
the female defendants that they are attached to, albeit in subtly different ways, by
denying their ability to make any degree of choice in relation to their filicidal
actions. Although such identity construction and agency denial may not always be
damaging to these filicidal women per se, its pervasiveness within legal discourse
reinforces and reproduces damaging gender stereotypes surrounding women and
femininity.
Keywords Women who kill  Agency  Identities  Femininity  Motherhood 
Narratives  Legal discourse  Legal language
1 Introduction
It is well recognised within existing literature that the law is not simply about ‘rules
and policies [but also about] stories, explanation, performances [and] linguistic
exchanges’ [8: 2]. Narrative, more specifically story-telling, is a central component
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of the law and legal discourse, particularly in case law and sentencing remarks [see
for example, 11, 13, 33]. Here, it is often the judge in particular who acts as final
storyteller, constructing a macro-narrative of the case through their lexical choices
and rhetoric which reflects and creates particular discourses around the case. Indeed
as Rackley explains, it is through ‘the way in which the judge tells the story [and]
the form and language of their opinion’ [33: 46] (emphasis added), that particular
narratives emerge in cases.
This article explores some of the ways in which the language and narratives of
law discursively constructs lived experiences and dominant identities for women
who kill their children. Focusing on this group of homicidal women provides an
area that is ripe for analysis, not least because within criminal legal discourse,
women continue to be constructed as legal objects, rather than subjects, and thus
more easily have dominant identities constructed for them through narrative
creation [36]. Drawing upon Jackson’s work on narrative [13], I explore the socially
constructed narrative models of the experiences of filicidal women which emerge in
statutes, sentencing remarks, and case law. In particular I explore what Jackson
terms as the different ‘narrative typifications’ [13: 32–33] that emerge in these
cases. Narrative typification ‘refers to evaluative judgments based on their
perceived likeness to collective, prototypical images of criminals as well as other
narratively organised forms of social knowledge’ [11: 373]. In cases of women who
kill, this typification typically involves evaluation of the extent to which these
women’s actions can be consolidated or rehabilitated within understandings of
appropriate femininity. Narrative typification also allows for a consideration of the
micro-narratives related within a trial e.g. through competing evidence given by the
defendant and witnesses, and the macro-narrative of the trial itself [13: 33].
Although competing micro-narratives will emerge within the court room, the
macro-narrative that emerges from the case is as a result of evaluative judgments
made on the completeness of the stories told. Of particular interest in this article are
the macro-narratives which emerge in judgments and sentencing remarks in cases of
filicidal women and how they discursively create dominant narrative identities for
the women concerned. As will be evidenced, these judicial macro-narratives do not
necessarily reflect or incorporate the multiple micro-narratives related within the
cases, nor the intricacies of the lived experiences of the female defendants involved.
Drawing upon the existing literature which recognises the labelling of filicidal
women as ‘bad’, ‘mad’ or ‘sad’ [see for example, 22, 23, 25, 35], I take this further
by exploring how these dominant narrative identities emerge in the macro-narratives
of sentencing remarks, and case law, as well as critically engaging with the
consequences of such narrative typifications and identity constructions. More
specifically, I argue that in cases involving filicidal women, judicial and legal
rhetoric typically creates a macro-narrative that is focused primarily around agency
denial and the discursive construction of narrative identities for the filicidal mother
as either ‘bad’, ‘mad’ or ‘sad’. Typically, rather than the true complexity of
circumstances in such cases being acknowledged (i.e. multiple micro-narratives),
the macro-narrative invoked in judicial rhetoric typically reflects evaluations made
of the female defendants’ perceived degree of deviance from gendered stereotypes,
particularly those surrounding motherhood.
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It is important to note at the outset that in this article I am not arguing that the
macro-narratives of the ‘bad’, ‘mad’ and ‘sad’ woman are problematic per se.
Indeed, in some cases these narratives may accurately reflect the lived experiences
and actions of the filicidal women. Rather, I am arguing that these narratives emerge
in such a way that they discursively construct new dominant identities for these
women, which is problematic for three main reasons. Firstly, these narrative
identities are singular and thus absolute when they emerge, making them pervasive
for the women they are attached to, and in some instances preventing the micro-
narratives and nuances of the female defendants’ lived experiences from being fully
considered. Secondly, they deny the agency of filicidal women, albeit each in subtly
different ways, by denying their ability to make any degree of choice in relation to
their filicidal actions. Finally, these identities—and the subsequent agency denial
which occurs—reinforce pejorative gender stereotypes which are damaging for all
women, constructing them as pathological, weak, passive, and pitiful, as well as
deviant in failing to adhere to the expectations associated with motherhood.
Before commencing a critical analysis of each of the discursively constructed
identities of the ‘bad’, the ‘mad’ and the ‘sad’ filicidal woman, a note must be made
of the language and terminology used in this article. The term ‘filicide’ will be used
as a general one to refer to the act of a mother killing her child(ren). In contrast, the
term ‘infanticide’ is used here only in its legal sense in relation to the specific
offence/defence of infanticide found in the criminal law of England and Wales
(discussed in more detail later in the article). Finally, it is necessary to set out the
mechanics of the term agency, which will be defined here as; the ability of an
individual to choose to act or behave in a particular way [35: 338]. When referring
to agency denial here, it is more specifically active agency denial that is occurring
and thus being referred to. This is because discursively constructing a singular,
dominant, narrative identity for these women is a positive, ‘active’, act of doing.
This can be contrasted with the passive denials of agency that occur due to the
continuing masculine gendering of the legal subject, and construction of women as
legal objects who are acted upon within criminal legal discourse [36: 7]. Thus, it is
because of these women’s status as objects, whose agency is passively denied, that
the ‘mad’, ‘bad’, and ‘sad’ woman narratives can discursively construct new
dominant identities for them which actively deny their agency.
2 The Motherhood Mandate
Before exploring the narratives and identities discursively constructed in, and by,
the law in cases of women who kill their children, it is first necessary to briefly
identify the social context within which these emerge and exist. The gendered
meanings, stereotypes and norms of appropriate femininity which are attached to
women’s body are extensive. However, within the context of filicidal women the
ideology of motherhood for all women is most prominent. Indeed, ‘western society
has strong beliefs about motherhood … mother is one of the most fundamental
archetypes of woman… motherhood is viewed as central to a woman’s identity and
fulfilment’ [2: 317–318].
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The ideology of motherhood for all women is also known as the ‘‘motherhood
mandate’’ or the ‘‘motherhood mystique’’; a ‘[c]ulturally proscribed belief that to be
complete and successful in the female role, a woman must have children and must
spend her time with them’ [24: 223]. The mandate comprises a number of myths
including the notions that those women who do not want to be mothers are disturbed
or deviant, and those who cannot have children are being fundamentally deprived of
a central aspect of what it means to be a woman. Within the mandate, there is a
particular focus on voluntarily childless women, who ‘[h]ave been understood in
ways that emphasise their selfishness and their deviance, as aberrant, immature, and
unfeminine’ [9: 225]. For women who do have children, so-called ‘good’ mothers
enjoy caregiving and self-sacrificing to the needs of their children; those that do not
are ‘bad’ mothers. Mothers should devote themselves full-time to their children and
therefore those who work are often considered to be inferior [2: 318–319].
Women are also expected to protect their children from harm, even if that is at
the expense of their own personal safety and autonomy. This expectation is reflected
within legal discourse, for example the offence of ‘causing or allowing the death of
a child or vulnerable adult’ [3]. The expectation of protection from harm has also
been emphasised within case law in R v Sally Lorraine Emery [32], where the
mother, a victim of domestic abuse, failed to protect her child from violence by the
father. In her appeal, Lord Justice Taylor CJ stated:
It cannot be too clearly emphasised … that a parent’s paramount duty is to
protect his or her child. Failure to do so … cannot be excused by other
pressures that may have been upon the mother, unless they were such as to
render her incapable of action. Still less can such failure be excused by a
mother putting her relationship with her partner, or even her own protection,
before the life and health of her child [32: 396].
Therefore, when women have children it is not enough for them to be ‘‘just’’
mothers, they must be ‘‘good mothers’’ and conform to the stereotypes and
expectations associated with, and symbiotic to, the role. Perhaps most importantly,
they must be self-effacing, self-sacrificing and put the well-being of their child(ren)
before everything, anything, and anyone else.
The prevalence and pervasiveness of the socially constructed norms within the
motherhood mandate means that when women kill their children ‘they present a
profound challenge to accepted notions of motherhood and the protection offered by
mothers to their children’ [5: 585]. I now turn to the legal response to such gendered
deviance, in particular critically engaging with the macro-narratives that emerge in
such cases, which discursively construct dominant identities for filicidal women that
deny their agency.
3 The ‘Bad’ Woman?
The ‘bad’ filicidal woman is perhaps most frequently conjured up as the image of
women who kill their children. However, when the ‘bad’ woman narrative emerges
in cases involving women killers, the discourse around the term ‘bad’ differs from
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simply referring to criminal or deviant behaviour. Instead, when the term ‘bad’ is
used in relation to filicidal women it is referring to their extreme deviance from
appropriate feminine behaviour, and more specifically their deviance from the
motherhood mandate. This deviance is perceived as being unexplainable or
inexcusable as a result of mental illness or life circumstances. Consequently, ‘what
is being alleged is these women are perceived as being wicked, an ‘extra element’ of
bad that goes beyond their actual crime’ [35: 346], which cannot be explained or
justified in any way, for example through the use of defences such as diminished
responsibility or infanticide.
Unsurprisingly then, ‘bad’ women who kill their children are viewed as doubly
deviant; ‘these women not only break the law, but by breaking the law they
transgress their own female nature and their primary social identity as a mother or
potential mother’ [34: 107]. These homicidal ‘bad’ mothers demolish the
construction of motherhood for all women. Therefore, the macro-narrative of such
cases focuses on their failures as mothers and thus also as women, as well as the
form of ‘monstrous’ motherhood that they engaged in when killing their child(ren).
Indeed, in the context of mothers who kill their children, the ‘bad’ woman narrative
vilifies the filicidal woman as an abomination. More specifically, in such cases the
women have their status demoted firstly from ‘mothers’ to ‘women’ and then to
non-women, non-human monsters. Indeed, as noted by Huckerby; ‘the act of killing
one’s child is considered so antithetical to the behavioural norms of motherhood to
justify the ‘‘demotion’’ of status from ‘‘mother’’ to the pre-maternal state of
‘‘woman’’’ [10: 151].
For women whose identity is discursively constructed as that of the ‘bad’ woman
and thus ‘bad’ mother, their status is further demoted from woman to non-woman,
to that of a monster lacking humanity. As Morrissey argues, women ‘murderers
considered to have performed especially dastardly acts are transformed into
monsters… and are thus disconnected from their societies and from the human race
in general’ [23: 16]. Thus within the ‘bad’ woman narrative, these women
demonstrate a monstrous, non-human ‘‘form of mothering’’ with their depravity,
selfishness, callousness, and violence, which is dichotomous to that expected within
the motherhood mandate. The filicidal ‘bad’ woman is so non-feminine, that she is
non-woman, non-human, and thus discursively constructed as a monster. This
reflects what Jackson calls society’s ‘stock of substantive narratives … which
provides the framework for understanding particular stories presented in discourse’
[13: 20]. In the case of the ‘bad’ woman the macro-narrative that emerges constructs
a dominant identity for the filicidal woman as a ‘medusa-style’, mythical, non-
human character.
3.1 R v Amanda Hutton and R v Rebecca Shuttleworth
This construction of filicidal women as ‘bad’ is illustrated in the sentencing remarks
of two recent cases; R v Amanda Hutton and Tariq Khan [27] and R v Rebecca
Shuttleworth and Luke Southerton [30]. In R v Amanda Hutton [27], Hutton was
convicted of manslaughter for the unlawful killing of her four-year-old son,
Hamzah, whom she neglected and starved to death. She was also convicted of
Bad, Mad or Sad? Legal Language, Narratives, and identity…
123
preventing his proper burial for 2 years, having left his body to mummify in his cot,
as well as being found guilty of several other counts relating to child cruelty of her
other young children. In R v Rebecca Shuttleworth [30], Shuttleworth was convicted
of murdering her 2 year-old son, Keanu, after seriously assaulting him and then
subsequently failing to arrange appropriate medical attention to treat his life-
threatening injuries. She was also convicted of cruelty towards another child.
Neither woman successfully made use of any defences which could have
mitigated or ‘excused’ their actions. Moreover, the heinousness of their actions was
perceived as being so deferent to that expected within the motherhood mandate that
the overriding narrative in both of these cases focused on the ‘inexcusable’ actions
of these women, their failures as mothers and thus as women and as humans, and the
consequences that this had for their children.
Both Hutton and Shuttleworth have specific mention made to their failures as
mothers, their inadequacies in caring for and protecting their children, as well as
their selfishness [27: 1, 3–4, 25: 2–3]. In particular, attention is drawn to breaches of
the duty of care associated with, and assumed to arise from, motherhood. In Hutton
the judge noted that starving her son, Hamzah, to death demonstrated her
‘longstanding and wretched breaches of [the] most simple and fundamental
requirements’ of being a mother [27: 3] and that her actions had to ‘[b]e regarded as
a bad a case of unlawful killing of a child by a parent as it is possible to imagine’
[27: 5]. Similarly, in Shuttleworth her inadequacies as a mother were persistently
affirmed through the use of phrases such as; ‘you failed to attend appropriately to his
needs … you persistently neglected … you laughed it off …’ [30: 2–3]. It was
explained that her actions were termed to be ‘the grossest abuse of a position of
trust’, with the judge noting it was Shuttleworth’s most basic and natural duty as a
mother to protect her son [30: 6]. This focus on the maternal failings of these
women constructs both of them as no longer being mothers, but instead as failed
pre-maternal women.
Further demotion of these ‘bad’ women to non-human monsters occurs as a result
of a narrative that focuses on their deviant and depraved actions. Indeed, in both
Hutton and Shuttleworth the language used by the judge is emotive, vivid, and
pejorative in the extreme, invoking imagery and thus constructing a macro-narrative
of these women as wicked and evil; as monsters. The semantic fields used in both
cases are evocative and mythological, for example; ‘mummified’; ‘squalor’;
‘dreadful’; ‘callous indifference’. Interestingly, the monstrous creature construction
is invoked in subtly different ways in both of these cases. Within the sentencing
remarks in Hutton there was a more sustained focus on her actions, what she did, as
well as her omissions in providing for her child(ren). In contrast, in Shuttleworth, the
monstrosity narrative emerges in relation to a focus on her son’s injuries, and thus
more clearly on the outcome(s) of her actions.
Taking first the case of Hutton, her actions were described as ‘wicked’ [27: 3]
and her attitude towards her son as ‘cruel’ [27: 4]. Within the sentencing remarks,
there was a clear and detailed focus on the way in which she neglected her children,
particularly Hamzah, with the judge centring on how she purposefully starved him,
whilst also noting that his siblings ‘in fact received less than adequate food
themselves’ [27: 4]. Attention was also drawn to the living conditions of the
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children, with the judge noting that Hutton was bringing all of the children up in
‘breathtakingly awful’ squalor [27: 3]. It was made clear that Hutton’s actions were
purposeful and no explanation or excuse could be provided for her lack of care for
Hamzah or her other children; ‘your deviousness and entirely purposeful conduct in
keep various Agencies away from you and your children, so that you were doing
was not discovered, must be a feature of this case …’ [27: 3].
Perhaps the most powerful passage within the sentencing remarks, which
reinforced and reflected the discursive construction of Hutton as monstrous and non-
human, focused on the starvation of her son:
The most telling and awful fact in this case that speaks volumes about how
you starved Hamzah is that when his mummified remains were found he was
comfortably clothed in a ‘babygro’ which was designed for a 6 to 9 month old
child. Moreover, he was found in a cot wearing, at the age of 4.5 years, a
nappy [27: 4].
This passage, although noting the outcomes of her behaviour, clearly highlighted
her actions in failing to feed her child and the tremendous neglect and suffering
inflicted on her son, in particular the way in which after he died his remains were
left to mummify. This combined with the horrific imagery painted by such a detailed
focus on her actions (and omissions) not only explicitly reinforced the reference
made to Hutton as being a ‘bad’ mother, but also constructed a macro-narrative
based around a dominant identity of her as a depraved monster.
This construction of Hutton as non-human and non-woman was solidified by
explicit recognition that Hutton would never be allowed to care for a child again;
‘you Amanda Hutton must be regarded as a real danger to any child with whom you
may live, or in any way have care of in the future, the possibility of you ever in fact
being in the situation of caring for a child is so remote …’ [27: 2]. No opportunity
was given either during the sentencing, or indeed in the future, for Hutton to be
rehabilitated to the status of full womanhood. Her status as a non-human, monstrous
creature was absolute and unyielding.
In contrast in Shuttleworth, it was the vivid description of the injuries suffered by
her ‘defenceless’ [30: 1] two-year-old son that demoted her from explicitly being
recognised as a ‘bad’ mother, to discursively constructing her as a monster.
Although there was also some consideration of her actions, particularly in relation to
the facts of the case, by focusing in such detail upon the distress and injury suffered
by her son, Shuttleworth’s dominant identity as being non-human was cemented.
The judge focused not only upon the fatal injuries sustained by Keanu, but also
previous serious injuries he had received from Shuttleworth. For example; ‘There
was a nasty burn to the sole of his foot … consistent with his foot being held by
force against a hot radiator or other hot surface… you left Keanu to limp in pain all
day until he had to go to hospital that evening when even more serious injuries had
been caused’ [30: 4]. In particular, the descriptions of Keanu’s fatal injuries were
detailed and graphic;
No one could look at the photographs of Keanu taken after his death, or even
the body mapping images of the multiple injuries he suffered, without being
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appalled at the brutality they represent. There must have been many separate
blows … There were injuries inflicted to his abdomen, his chest, his face, his
head, and his back … The depth and extent of bruising to Keanu’s back
strongly suggests he must have been thrown or slammed against the floor or a
wall or another firm surface for at least part of the attack upon him. One can
scarcely imagine the pain and distress Keanu must have suffered from this
outburst of violence … [30: 5].
The detailed descriptions and imagery of the violence and extent of the injuries
Keanu sustained, created a narrative within which her behaviours were constructed
as being so deviant and antithetical not only to motherhood and femininity, but also
to humanity, that she could only have been acting as a monster. For it is only a
monster who would inflict such injuries on any child, let alone their own child, in
such a way.
This non-woman, non-human, monstrous construction was further reinforced by
contrasting her murderous actions with the innocence of her child. Indeed, the judge
made specific reference to Keanu’s character at length, as well as his relationships
with others;
Keanu was a delightful little boy, described as a real character, a little
entertainer, who remained cheerful despite everything. Joyful was the word
that more than one witness used to describe him. He was a much loved
brother, grandson, nephew and cousin. He was a favourite at nursery as well as
in the family. His death has left a void in many lives which will never be filled
[30: 1–2].
Alongside this it was noted that ‘Keanu relished the attention [Shuttleworth] gave
him when [she] could be bothered to do so and there is no doubt that there was a
strong bond between [the two of them] for the good’ [30: 3]. The dichotomy
between Shuttleworth’s violent, neglectful, and homicidal actions and the descrip-
tions of Keanu further enhanced Shuttleworth’s depravity and the extent to which
she deviated not only from expectations of motherhood, but those of humanity more
generally.
3.2 Agency Denial
The ‘bad’ woman construction is absolute; it is a singular narrative identity. Within
this ‘bad’ woman macro-narrative there is no space for the micro-narratives of the
case to emerge and be fully considered. Thus, the dominant identity of the female
defendant becomes that of the ‘bad’ woman/mother/monster. This is clearly
demonstrated in Hutton, where it was acknowledged in passing that she was an
alcoholic, and thus there was potential to include some divergence within the ‘bad’
woman narrative. Instead the judge used this to further enhance the macro-narrative
which constructed her as a ‘bad’ woman, mother, and monster. He commented:
‘your use of alcohol over the years gives a real insight into you as a parent … you
placed your own selfish addiction to drink well before your responsibilities to your
many children’ [27: 4].
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Similarly, in Shuttleworth approximately three of the twenty-nine paragraphs of
the sentencing remarks [30: 2–3] are dedicated to acknowledging the difficult
childhood and abusive relationships she experienced. Such an approach highlighted
the micro-narratives relayed and related within the case. Indeed, the judge explicitly
noted his acknowledgment of her ‘troubled upbringing’, the domestic violence she
experienced, and ‘the assistance provided to the police recently in connection with
another distressing criminal investigation’ [30: 7]. However, these micro-narratives
within the case were ultimately used to reinforce the macro-narrative of the case by
further highlighting her inadequacies as a mother. Indeed, reference was made to the
fact that it was her father, and not her, who took over the parental role for the twins
born out of her abusive relationship [30: 2]. The judge noted that the mitigating
factors justified a ‘substantially smaller’ reduction in the sentence, than the
aggravating factors when taken with the facts of the case as a whole [30: 7]. Thus it
is apparent that the macro-narrative of the ‘bad’ woman, which constructs a
dominant identity for the female defendant of a monster, occurs as a result of an
evaluation by the judge of the competing micro-narratives within the case. When
invoked, it is the dominant ‘bad’ woman/mother/monster narrative that overrides all
others to become the macro-narrative, with the other competing micro narratives
failing to be truly considered when constructing an identity for the filicidal woman.
Discursively constructing this ‘bad’ woman singular narrative identity is an
attempt within legal discourse to nullify the challenge that these homicidal women
pose to appropriate femininity as dictated by gender discourse, and more
specifically, to understandings of motherhood. However, in creating a dominant
identity focused upon non-human, monstrous mythology, not only are these gender
norms being reinforced, but socio-legal discourse is also failing to explicitly
acknowledge the ability of all women and mothers to choose to be violent towards,
and ultimately kill, their child(ren). Such an approach denies the agency of not only
these filicidal ‘bad’ women, but also of all women.
Within such cases it appears, prima facie, that there is space for some agency
recognition to occur, particularly where the judge focuses upon the woman’s actions
without invoking explicit excuses or justifications for her behaviours, for example as
in Hutton, discussed above. In both Hutton and Shuttleworth, the judge described
their actions in an active voice, suggesting agentical wrong-doing. For example,
Shuttleworth ‘failed to attend’ [30: 3], ‘persistently neglected’ [30: 2], ‘laughed it
off’ [30: 3], and Hutton is condemned for her ‘entirely purposeful conduct’ [27: 3],
with her alcoholism being constructed as an intentional choice; ‘you placed your
own selfish addition to drink well before your responsibility to your many children’
[27: 4]. Thus, prima facie, it seems that in cases involving ‘bad’ women, the female
defendants are actually viewed as hyper-agents, who have made condemnable
choices and are thus are fully responsible for their actions. They are unable to
sufficiently benefit from any micro-narratives in their cases which suggest any
mitigation may be appropriate.
However, when this hyper-agency is combined with the macro-narrative of these
‘bad’ women as non-women, non-human, monsters, a deeper analysis shows that
agency denial is still occurring. Although agency is being recognised, more
specifically here hyper-agency, both the agent and the type of agency is
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unrecognisably feminine or human. The ‘doer behind the deed’ in cases of ‘bad’
filicidal women, is not the woman herself, but the non-human monster which is
constructed as her dominant identity within the legal narrative. The agent here is the
non-human monster constructed by the macro-narrative of the case, rather than the
filicidal woman herself. This explains the hyper-agency evident in the judicial
language: women are not capable of being hyper-agents due to the masculine
gendering of the legal subject and thus their status as ‘objects’ within legal discourse
[36]. The hyper-agency is thus not being attributed to the female defendants
themselves, but rather to the non-human, mythical creatures they are transformed
into. Therefore, in cases of ‘bad’ women who kill their children, it is not these
women as mothers or indeed even as women or humans who have chosen to act.
Rather it is within the context of their singular narrative identities as non-women,
inhuman monsters that they have acted. They have not acted as human women but
rather as monstrous creatures whose humanity has been rejected. Thus ‘bad’ filicidal
women have their agency, as women and as humans, denied.
This is reinforced by Morrissey [23: 25] who explains; ‘the agency denial which
takes place in this technique is specifically that of human agency. The murderess is
considered to have acted, but not as a human woman.’ Therefore, a filicidal woman
discursively constructed as ‘bad’ is ‘[n]ot just monsterised but [is] transformed into
the living embodiment of mythic evil through her relation to figures traditionally
interpreted in this way’ [23: 25]. In Hutton and Shuttleworth the vivid dichotomies
of the expected behaviour of a good mother, and thus a human woman, were
contrasted with continued references to the abhorrent acts perpetrated against, and
injuries suffered by, their children, thus evidencing their lack of adherence to any
measure of appropriate femininity or humanity. These dichotomous constructions
combined to deny the agency of these ‘bad’ filicidal women, specifically as women
and as humans [35: 352].
Filicidal women whose human agency is denied but non-human monstrous
agency is recognised, are severely punished. These bad women are viewed as being
doubly deviant [16] not only have they broken the law and thus offended against
society, they have also violated appropriate feminine behaviour and thus have
offended against gender norms. They are punished more formally and severely than
women whose behaviour can be more readily constructed in relation to appropriate
femininity, and whose humanity is recognised and thus agency denied in gendered
ways (discussed later in the article in relation to the ‘mad’ and ‘sad’ woman). Both
Hutton and Shuttleworth received lengthy prison sentences: Hutton was sentenced
to 15 years imprisonment and Shuttleworth was sentenced to life imprisonment with
a minimum term of 18 years. Although these sentences may arguably be viewed as
appropriate, the consequence of their humanity, and thus human agency, being
denied is little chance of rehabilitation to the status of a human, let alone a woman,
for these female defendants. The requirement of punishment for these ‘bad’ women
whose human agency is denied reflects the non-human, monstrous singular narrative
identity created for them.
The agency denial in cases of ‘bad’ women is also problematic in relation to the
impact it has on all women. Indeed, the identity transformation of the ‘bad’ filicidal
woman into a non-human monster whose human agency is denied, also arguably
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denies the agency of all women. Transforming these women into non-human
creatures when no justifiable excuse or explanation can be offered for their filicidal
actions, suggests that every woman is incapable of making the choice to kill their
own child. That is to say that every woman is incapable of exercising her agency as
a woman. Such an approach only serves to uphold and reinforce the motherhood
mandate and gender stereotypes around all women, requiring them to be caring,
compassionate, and home-makers.
4 The ‘Mad’ Woman?
The discursive construction of the filicidal woman as ‘mad’ is dichotomous to that
of the ‘bad’ woman. The ‘mad’ woman construction is typically invoked in cases
where the female defendant successfully utilises the plea of infanticide. The ‘mad’
woman construction as a response to filicidal women is unremarkable, as throughout
history a common response to women’s violence has been to invoke pathological
and medical discourses to explain such deviance. In 1895, Lombroso and Ferrero
[17] were amongst the first proponents of pathologising women offenders’
behaviour. They theorised that women were less highly developed and less
intellectually capable than men and therefore less likely to commit crime.
Consequently, they labelled offending women as ‘abnormal’ and ‘pathological’
[17].
Despite advances in scholarship and universal criticism of Lombroso and
Ferrero’s work, both contemporary society and the law continues to locate women’s
criminality within the ‘‘psy’’ discourses in particular, as it offers a tolerable
explanation for their deviant behaviours. Although it may indeed be the case that
some female defendants are suffering from a mental disorder, in many cases, where
pathological macro-narratives are invoked this occurs at the expense of a fuller
exploration of the circumstances of the case and thus consideration of the multiple
micro-narratives involved. Indeed, as Lambie has argued, a macro-narrative focused
around mental disturbance often disguises ‘[t]he relevance of social and economic
factors, including dysfunctional parenting and inadequate knowledge about
contraception’ [14: 76]. This results in the construction of a dominant identity of
the ‘mad’ woman for these women, which is pervasive and overwhelming.
4.1 Infanticide
The legal offence/defence of infanticide was introduced in 1922, reflecting the
social and legal dynamics of recognising filicidal women as being partially
exculpated as a result of mental incapacity [18: 216]. In its original form the defence
only applied to women who killed their new-born child(ren), when their ‘‘‘balance
of mind’’ was ‘‘disturbed’’ by the effect of childbirth’ [18: 216]. The Infanticide Act
1922 was repealed and re-enacted, with modifications, by The Infanticide Act 1938,
which is still in in force today. ‘By contrast to the 1922 Act’s reference to ‘‘newly
born’’, the 1938 Act set a 12-month age limit for the child and introduced an
additional clause providing that a defendant’s mind could be disturbed by ‘‘the
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effects of lactation’’ (breastfeeding) as well as ‘‘by the effect of giving birth’’’ [18:
217].
The current law on infanticide can be found in section one of The Infanticide Act
1938:
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or
omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the
effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstand-
ing that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would
have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide,
and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty
of the offence of manslaughter of the child.
Before a more detailed analysis of the ‘mad’ woman narrative that emerges in
cases of infanticide, several particulars relating to the statute must be noted. Firstly,
infanticide is a gendered offence; it can only be committed by female defendants
who kill their own child(ren), thus encoding ‘what was… the long-standing special
status accorded to women who kill their infants’ [18: 217]. Secondly, infanticide is a
partial defence to murder, as well as being recognised as a distinct homicide
defence. Thus the terms ‘offence’ and ‘defence’ will be used interchangeably,
alongside ‘the law/doctrine of infanticide’ throughout this article. Thirdly,
infanticide is ‘the only offence in English law for which a pre-condition is the
possession of an abnormal mental state’ [20: 664].
Finally, there is no requirement that the female defendant’s disturbance of mind
caused her to kill her child, rather a temporal connection is required [19: 704]. ‘So,
any murder of a child under the age of 12 months by its biological mother, whatever
the reason, is capable of amounting to infanticide as long as at the time of the
murder the balance of her mind was disturbed’ [15: 166]. This simplified
relationship between the defendant’s mental incapacity and the act of killing her
child, as Loughman argues, ‘forecloses the question of the defendant’s responsi-
bility for her offence … the infanticidal woman is in effect decreed to have
attenuated responsibility for her actions’ [19: 704].
As can be seen in both the definition and initial observations made of infanticide,
it is an offence that invokes discourses of medicalisation, pathology and
abnormality in relation to the postnatal female body and biology. This is reflected
in the terminology used within the statute, through phraseology such as ‘the balance
of her mind was disturbed’ and ‘not having fully recovered’ [12]. These discourses
are reinforced in the legal basis for the plea of infanticide; a diagnosis of puerperal
psychosis. This is a ‘severe mental disorder which affects one or two out of every
1000 women within the first few weeks of childbirth. The symptoms span a number
of categories of psychosis … from mania to delusions to acute depression’ [22:
206–207].
Although a diagnosis of puerperal psychosis is in theory required to convict a
woman of infanticide, research has highlighted that it ‘[i]s very rarely the cause of a
mother killing her child. Estimates are that this occurs in around five cases a year’
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[22: 207]. Therefore, the courts have traditionally interpreted this strict criterion
more liberally to include any sort of psychiatric disorder, or indeed in some cases to
include women who are not suffering from any sort of mental disorder. This is
reflected in research cited by Morris and Wilczynski which suggests that ‘[a]bout
half of the women who … are convicted of infanticide are not suffering from any
identifiable mental disorder at all’ [21: 35]. The use of infanticide in such contexts
allows for an explanation to be secured for the actions of these filicidal women.
More specifically, this ‘mad’ woman macro-narrative reflects gender discourse
around appropriate femininity and the idea that all women are inherently irrational,
and emotionally unstable, particularly as a result of their biological functions.
4.1.1 R v Sainsbury and R v Sultan
The use of psychiatric and pathological language and discourse, perhaps
unsurprisingly, extends outside of the infanticide statute itself into the macro-
narratives that emerge from the case law. In R v Sainsbury [31], the appellant, Joan
Sainsbury, gave birth ‘to a baby boy in squalid circumstances sitting on a lavatory in
the bathroom of her boyfriend’s flat’ [31: 534]. She received no medical assistance
or pain relief. Following the birth, Sainsbury and her boyfriend wrapped the baby in
a blanket and disposed of the child ‘across the country in an isolated part of the
River Frome’ [31: 534]. At trial, she was convicted of infanticide.
During the trial and subsequent appeal against her sentence of 12 months
detention in a young offender’s institution, the narrative in the case focused almost
exclusively upon her fragile mental condition, thus discursively constructing a
dominant identity for her as being that of a ‘mad’ woman. Of the 72 lines of Lord
Justice Russell’s judgment in the Court of Appeal, 22 of them referred explicitly to
Joan’s mental state, with the majority of the remaining lines of the judgment
focusing on the facts of the case and the grounds of appeal relating to her sentence.
Joan was referred to as having the ‘mentality of a 12 year old’, as being ‘a woman in
body but a child in mind’ and ‘quite unable to cope with pregnancy’ [31: 534]. The
birth of her son was described as leaving ‘the balance of her mind disturbed so as to
prevent rational judgment and decisions’ [31: 534].
A similar linguistic approach was taken in the more recent case of Natasha Sultan
[4], where again the macro-narrative of the case focused upon her mental
deficiencies, thus constructing a dominant identity of her as a ‘mad’ woman. Sultan
fatally fractured her six-week-old daughter’s skull following a ‘sudden explosion of
violence’ [4: 4]. She then put the baby into the cot and went to sleep, with her
partner finding the child unconscious when he returned home the following morning
from working his night shift. During sentencing, Sultan was referred to as an ‘utterly
broken woman’, who had acted as a result of ‘an uncontrolled explosion born from a
disturbance of the mind associated with childbirth’ [4]. She was explicitly
acknowledged as being in, what was termed as, a ‘‘maelstrom of fatigue and mental
disorder’’, and as suffering from postnatal depression at the time of killing her
daughter [4]. In both Sainsbury and Sultan pathological and medical narratives
dominated and were pervasive within the judicial rhetoric, with reference being
made, and analysis conducted throughout the judgements, in relation to their mental
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disturbances. Both women were subsequently constructed as mentally disturbed and
imbalanced; as ‘mad’ women.
Creating a narrative based around the discourse of the pathological ‘mad’ woman
who kills her child(ren) reflects and reinforces existing socio-legal and gender
discourse which constructs women as irrational, emotionally abnormal, and seen to
be ‘in need of psychiatric help more than men’ [6: 20]. The use of language within
both the statute and case law, which focuses on mental abnormality, imbalance, and
disturbance, unsurprisingly constructs a macro-narrative of the infanticidal woman
as being ‘mad’. Within this macro-narrative, there is no space for competing micro-
narratives to emerge, with the semantics of particular lexical choices in infanticide
cases focusing almost exclusively on the mental illness and imbalance of the female
defendant. Thus, the primary concern with the ‘mad’ woman construction is not that
these women are discursively constructed as ‘mad’ per se. Rather it is that they are
constructed as ‘mad’ within a macro-narrative that does not allow for the emergence
of micro-narratives that more extensively examine their circumstances, instead
automatically pathologising their actions and thus denying their agency.
Indeed, in both Sainsbury and Sultan, there was no significant consideration
given to the wider circumstances within which their filicides took place. In
particular, in Sainsbury there was potential for more significant attention to be given
to the context within which the case arose, for example the young age of the
defendant (she was only 15 years old) and the apparent lack of supervision and
neglect by her parents [31: 534]. Instead, during the appeal these issues received
very brief consideration, a total of approximately 8 of the 72 lines of the judgment,
and largely within the context of the facts of the case. For example, the judge briefly
noted ‘that having been removed from the custody, care and control of her parents
this girl was thriving with the assistance of caring foster parents’ [31: 534]. Despite
this micro-narrative focusing on neglect from her parents potentially being an
important factor in the case, Sainsbury’s actions were instead pathologised with the
majority focus, as previously noted, being on her mental disturbance.
4.2 Agency Denial
The agency denial in cases of ‘mad’ filicidal women differs to that of ‘bad’ women.
Unlike the ‘bad’ woman, the ‘mad’ woman’s humanity is not removed or replaced
with that of a non-human monster. ‘Mad’ women maintain their humanity, and
indeed their femininity, throughout, and thus do not have their human agency
denied, rather it is their agency as women that is being denied.
In both Sainsbury and Sultan the defendants were presented as not truly intending
to kill their children and as not knowing what they were doing. In particular, in
Sultan, the judge made explicit reference to the fact that she was a ‘‘‘loving mother
who deeply wanted a child’’ and ‘‘adored’’ her daughter’ [4] and that her actions
‘were not of a calculating cruel woman, rather, an uncontrolled explosion born from
a disturbance of mind associated with childbirth’ [4]. Such judicial analysis and
rhetoric denies the agency of Sultan herself as a woman, instead associating any
agency with the ‘madness’ being experienced. Indeed, rather than acting as an
agent, she is discursively constructed as acting without any real intention or
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understanding of what she was doing. The agent, if any, in this scenario becomes the
so-called ‘explosion of madness’.
This non-agentic discourse which emerges in relation to the ‘mad’ woman
narrative is perhaps unsurprising, as within both law and society women are not
typically and readily recognised as agents [36: 1], instead having their decision-
making placed within the context of the biological and hormonal. Thus the agency
of women, and particularly that of those women who kill their children, is denied
within criminal legal discourse. Indeed, if agency is understood as referring to the
ability of individuals to choose to act or behave in a particular way [35: 338], as
discussed earlier in the article, in the case of infanticidal women, this is denied by a
macro-narrative that focuses exclusively on the influence of these women’s
biological functions on their choices. Rather than being understood as agents, the
actions of these women are narrated and thus constructed as ‘[a]bherrant
‘‘tragedies’’ for which they are not responsible’ [37: 424]. The ‘mad’ woman
macro-narrative within judicial rhetoric constructs infanticidal women as inherently
abnormal and thus as lacking agency; rather than exercising choice over their
actions. The sentiment is that they ‘must have been ‘‘mad’’ to kill [their] own
child[ren]’ [22: 36].
The erasure of the agency of these filicidal women is arguably not problematic
per se. Indeed, one consequence of the macro-narrative of the ‘mad’ woman and
subsequent denial of agency is more lenient treatment for these women within the
criminal justice system, reflecting the ‘chivalry hypothesis’. Within this hypothesis
it is argued that female offenders are treated preferentially in a male dominated
criminal justice system and are therefore protected from punishment. This is
particularly the case where gendered excuses and explanations can be offered for
their actions, for example, suffering from mental illness [26]. This is reflected in the
overwhelming use of non-custodial sentences for infanticidal ‘mad’ women which
was noted in Sainsbury; of the ‘59 cases of infanticide recorded in the … 10 years
between 1979 and 1988, not one… resulted in a custodial sentence. There [were] 52
orders either of probation or supervision [and] six hospital orders, one of which was
restricted’ [31: 534]. Looking more recently at the period between 1989 and 2000,
‘[o]f the 49 women convicted of infanticide … only two were jailed; the rest were
given probation, supervision or hospital orders’ [7]. Non-custodial sentences were
also given in both Sainsbury and Sultan, with the former receiving a three-year
probation order, and the latter a three-year supervision order.
For women convicted of infanticide the construction of a dominant ‘mad’ woman
identity and subsequent erasure of agency may therefore be beneficial in the
mitigation of punishment. The underlying pathological discourses reflect the notion
that rather than punitive treatment, these ‘mad’ women need ‘‘‘help to come to
terms with’’ what they have done’ [37: 424]. Indeed, in Sainsbury the appeal judges
explicitly documented their disagreement with the trial judge’s ‘reasoning to the
effect that the welfare of society in this case demanded a custodial sentence’ [31:
535]. Highlighting the need to support and treat Sainsbury, rather than protect
society from a dangerous agentic criminal, they noted how ‘without any hesitation
whatever’ [31: 535], a probation order was viewed as being the appropriate response
in the case, ‘to best serve the interests not only of this appellant but of society as
Bad, Mad or Sad? Legal Language, Narratives, and identity…
123
well’ [31: 535]. Thus it is support and treatment for non-agentic, mad, filicidal
women that is viewed as being most appropriate to all concerned.
Despite the ‘mad’, non-agentic woman stereotype that is constructed, it is likely
that many of these female defendants will not care that they are being stereotyped in
this way, as long as the result is a more lenient sentence. Although narratives
constructed around gender stereotyping and agency denial have instrumental value
in the short term for individual infanticidal women, they also ensure that gender
stereotypes surrounding all women’s mental health remains firmly entrenched, i.e.
that all women are inherently emotional, irrational, and mentally unstable. As Allen
explains, ‘[c]enturies of experience should have taught us that the overall outcome
… is invariably the reinforcement of inequality, inferiority and disadvantage’ [1:
431], which takes the form of erasure of agency and the reinforcement of pejorative
feminine gender stereotypes. Thus, whilst the ‘mad’ woman may be less punitively
treated, she attracts other stigma around her mental health, as well as reinforcing
damaging stereotypes surrounding femininity and the denials of women’s agency.
5 The ‘Sad’ Woman?
The narrative typifications of ‘mad’ and ‘bad’ filicidal women ‘are not immutable’
[10: 159]. An alternative macro-narrative is that of the ‘sad’ woman. The ‘sad’
woman narrative has emerged in cases of filicide where the mother has not
presented with any psychiatric disorder, and it is clear that she was not acting in a
particularly heinous or cruel and calculated manner in killing her child. Thus, the
‘sad’ woman narrative typically emerges in those cases where more lenient
treatment and empathy is perceived as being appropriate, but where this subjectively
cannot take the form of the ‘mad’ woman narrative.
The ‘sad’ woman macro-narrative emerges as a result of a consideration of the
multiple micro-narratives that consider the wider circumstances of the case,
allowing an explanation for the woman’s filicidal actions to be offered. Thus in such
cases it is often the particularly tragic circumstances surrounding the child’s death,
and the mother’s role in it, that take prevalence in the narrative that emerges. In
some ways, this makes the discursive construction of the ‘sad’ woman identity less
problematic as it may be an accurate reflection of the multiple micro-narratives in,
and wider context of, the case. However, these micro-narratives are often considered
through a gendered lense which results in the macro-narrative reflecting, reproduc-
ing, and reinforcing the gendered norms associated with appropriate femininity.
Indeed, the ‘sad’ woman narrative in the context of filicidal women typically
discursively constructs these women as pitiful, as ‘social casualties’ [37: 424], as
being unable to ‘cope with social pressures’ [22: 199] and thus reacting, often
irrationally, in response to their circumstances and inadequacies as women and as
mothers [37: 424]. Much like the ‘mad’ and ‘bad’ woman constructions, the ‘sad’
woman narrative is singular and absolute, thus discursively constructing this as the
female defendants’ dominant identity.
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5.1 R v Nkosiyapha Kunene and Virginia Kunene
The emergence and invocation of the ‘sad’ woman narrative is perhaps most evident
in the recent case of R v Nkosiyapha Kunene and Virginia Kunene [29]. The
defendants were the married parents of Ndingeko Kunene who died less than six
months after birth from florid rickets, resulting from a severe vitamin D deficiency.
He had medical problems from birth, with fluctuating health over the short period of
his life. However, because of their religious beliefs as strict Seventh Day Adventists,
his parents did not seek medical assistance when he became unwell at home.
Therefore, on the day he died, although both parents realised that he was very
unwell and at risk of death, they continued not to seek medical assistance. They both
pled guilty to gross negligence manslaughter. In particular, Mrs Kunene pled guilty
‘only on the basis of the omission to call for medical attention’ [29: 4].
The judicial rhetoric in this case focused upon the micro-narratives surrounding
the continuing ill health of the child and the difficulties faced by the parents in
reconciling their religious beliefs with caring for their son. Indeed, it was context
that was particularly important and thus focused upon in relation to Mrs Kunene’s
role in her son’s death, and her subsequent construction as a ‘sad’ woman. For
example, it was noted that she was not given advice about taking supplements to
support her breastfeeding despite the fact that she was vegan and was exclusively
feeding him that way, that her son was not initially diagnosed with a vitamin D
deficiency, and that she submitted to her husband, whose religious views in
particular were ‘very extreme’ [29: 2–3]. It was also explicitly noted that Mrs
Kunene did wish to seek medical attention for her son but was advised by her
husband ‘that it would be a sin in the eyes of God to call for medical assistance as he
had made a vow that he would await guidance from God before doing so’ [29: 4]. It
was acknowledged that her ‘religious convictions were a significant factor in
deference to her husband’s view … and her omission to call for medical attention’
[29:4].
The case was explicitly referred to in the opening lines of the judge’s sentencing
remarks as being ‘on any view a tragic [one]’ [29: 1] and reference was also made to
the fact that Mrs Kunene subsequently had a miscarriage following the death of her
son [29: 7]. By creating a macro-narrative reflecting the multiple micro-narratives
within the case and thus the context within which Mrs Kunene failed to act in
providing medical assistance to her son, the judge discursively constructed her as a
woman who had succumbed to social, cultural and religious pressures, particularly
from her husband. She was constructed as a caring mother who gave birth to a baby
who had numerous medical problems, and as a woman who deferred to her
husband’s judgment regarding medical treatment due to the pressures and
expectations of her religion. The tragedy for her as a ‘sad’ woman was multiple;
oversights in support that should have been offered regarding breast-feeding, the
delayed diagnosis of vitamin D deficiency in her son, responding inappropriately in
relation to his ill health because of her submission to religious beliefs and familial
pressures, her son’s subsequent death, and finally, suffering a miscarriage after
Ndingeko died.
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Her ‘sad’ woman dominant identity was further reinforced in sentencing, with the
judge passing different durations of imprisonment for the two defendants. The judge
explicitly accepted that ‘Mr Kunene’s culpability was higher than that of Mrs
Kunene, who wanted to call for medical assistance that day but deferred to his view’
[29: 8]. Subsequently, Mr Kunene was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, whereas
Mrs Kunene received a sentence of 2 years and 3 months imprisonment [29: 9].
5.2 The Relationship Between the ‘sad’ and ‘mad’ Woman: R v Kai-
Whitewind
The ‘sad’ woman narrative has also emerged in cases of infanticide where women
may not have the requisite mental illness diagnosis to successfully plead the
defence, but the facts of the case and the context within which they killed their
child(ren) are such that it is felt that they should be treated more leniently. Similarly,
in cases where the female defendant’s deviance from appropriate femininity and/or
the facts of the case are not perceived as being heinous or reprehensible enough to
construct a macro-narrative around the ‘bad’ woman, the ‘sad’ woman narrative
construction offers a palatable alternative. The relationship between the ‘mad’
woman and ‘sad’ woman narratives in the context of infanticide is perhaps
unsurprising, because, as was noted in the initial discussions on the offence, there is
no requirement of a causal link between the defendant’s mental disorder and their
filicidal actions.
Despite a requirement within infanticide that women should be suffering from a
disturbance of the mind, as has already been noted, the judiciary are traditionally
liberal in their interpretation of the requirement of puerperal psychosis, to include
any sort of recognised mental disorder or indeed include those women who are not
suffering from any sort of psychiatric illness at all. In such cases it is possible that
the ‘sad’ woman narrative is being invoked, which suggests that the use of this
macro-narrative in cases of filicide by mothers is far more subjective than those of
the ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ woman. This reflects the consideration of multiple micro-
narratives in constructing the ‘sad’ woman macro-narrative, and this as the
dominant identity of the filicidal woman. This can be contrasted with the dominant
identities of the ‘bad’ and ‘sad’ woman where, as noted earlier, the macro-narrative
of the case may not reflect the multiple micro-narratives within it. Therefore, it is
arguable that in relation to the ‘sad’ woman identity the judiciary is subjectively
incorporating within the parameters of the infanticide defence those women who are
not suffering from a recognised psychiatric condition by considering the multiple
micro-narratives which emerge. As such I would suggest that this discursive
construction of filicidal women as ‘sad’ is almost a non-pathologised extension of
the ‘mad’ woman narrative acknowledged earlier.
Reflecting this relationship between the narrative constructions of the ‘mad’ and
the ‘sad’ woman, there have been suggestions by the judiciary that the definition of
infanticide should be expanded to include cases involving the discursively
constructed ‘sad’ woman who is pitied because she cannot cope with societal and
mothering pressures. In R v Kai-Whitewind [28], the Court of Appeal in obiter
commented that ‘the law relating to infanticide is unsatisfactory and outdated. The
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appeal in this sad case demonstrates the need for a thorough re-examination’ [28:
458].
In this case, Chaha’oh Niyol Kai-Whitewind, the mother of three children, was
convicted of murdering her youngest son, twelve-week old Bidzil, who she claimed
had been conceived in the course of a rape. At trial, the Court heard how she
claimed to be suffering from depression and had discussed this with her health
visitor. Despite this, and Bidzil’s age being within that required for infanticide, no
evidence was put forward to sustain the defences of either diminished responsibility
or infanticide. Instead the defence case rested on the argument that her son had died
from ‘natural, even if unexplained causes’ [28: 457]. Passing judgment and
dismissing the appeal against her conviction, the Court of Appeal included some
observations on reforming the law of infanticide to include the discursively
constructed ‘sad’ woman within the offence’s remit. They questioned whether
‘[i]nfanticide should extend to circumstances subsequent to the birth, but connected
with it, such as the stresses imposed on a mother by the absence of natural bonding
with her baby …’ [28: 484]. They also suggested that infanticide may be an
appropriate defence in cases where ‘the mother … has in fact killed her infant [but]
is unable to admit it’, suggesting that her denials may in and of themselves, be a
symptom of a mental disorder and her filicidal actions [28: 484].
The issues raised in Kai-Whitewind were considered by the Law Commission in
their review of the law of infanticide, in particular the dilemma of how the law
should deal ‘with cases in which a mother suffering from a postpartum psychiatric
disorder kills her child, but denies the killing’ [15: 167]. Their recommendation was
that where the issue of infanticide is not raised during trial, the trial judge should be
given ‘the power to order a medical examination of the defendant with a view to
establishing whether or not there is evidence that at the time of the killing the
requisite elements of a charge of infanticide were present’ [15: 167]. It should be
noted however that this recommendation was never implemented into the statute.
The implication of such a reform could have been to more easily allow those
discursively constructed ‘sad’ women, unable to cope with social and mothering
pressures, to instead be constructed as ‘mad’ women with a recognised mental
disorder. That is to say, that there would be potential for the ‘sad’ woman narrative
to become that of the ‘mad’ woman in such cases.
5.3 Agency Denial
Similarly to the ‘mad’ woman, the ‘sad’ woman has her agency denied whilst
maintaining her humanity and her femininity. In such cases, although there is no
doubt that the female defendant acted (or in the case of Kunene omitted to do so),
her ability to make choices with regard to her behaviours is ultimately inhibited
because of a consideration of the tragic circumstances surrounding these cases. This
‘sad’ woman construction sits well with gender discourse which constructs women
as being ‘subject to control at the hands of their partners and a patriarchal society’
[25: 113], and thus as victims of their circumstances. Thus, their agency is denied
due to their construction as victims of circumstance, acting as a result of being
unable to cope with motherhood and social pressures, rather than being able to make
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their own choices with regards to their mothering behaviour. Consequently, they are
not seen to have made the choice to act, rather they, and their actions, are merely the
products of their limited life experiences, the pressures associated with motherhood
and, more widely, societal, cultural, and religious pressures, which they are unable
to manage or to resist.
As in the case of the ‘mad’ woman, the discursive construction of the ‘sad’
woman whose agency is denied may be beneficial in securing more lenient
treatment. For example, the sentence of just over 2 years received by Mrs Kunene.
However, once again this kind of agency denial is harmful for women, and
particularly mothers, by reinforcing the stereotypes associated with the motherhood
mandate and more widely those of appropriate femininity. The ‘sad’ woman
narrative discursively constructs these women as meek, passive, and victims of
tragedy and difficult life circumstances, and as such maintains that they should be
pitied and not vilified. The ‘sad’ woman narrative reinforces the need for adherence
to the motherhood mandate and feminine gender stereotypes by all women by
highlighting the tragedy of women who are unable to conform. For example, women
who are unable to ‘naturally’ and ‘properly’ bond with their child(ren) [28], women
who are not properly advised with regards to the treatment of their child(ren)
(Kunene) [29], or where they lack practical skill or knowledge in relation to the care
of their child(ren). Whilst agency denial may allow women to win their individual
battles within the criminal justice system by securing more lenient sentences, it does
little to allow women to win the war against having to conform to feminine gender
stereotypes or having their individual agency recognised.
6 Concluding Thoughts
In this article I have critically engaged with narratives that emerge in cases of
women who kill their children. In particular, I have argued that three macro-
narratives typically emerge which discursively construct dominant identities for
filicidal women as ‘bad’, ‘mad’ or ‘sad’ women. Although invoking differing
discourses, all three of the dominant identities constructed by the narratives
reinforce gender norms associated with appropriate femininity. The ‘mad’ and ‘sad’
representations not only reinforce, but also reproduce, gendered norms associated
with appropriate femininity, such as irrationality, passivity, and weakness. The
‘bad’ woman construct is invoked slightly differently. Rather than also reproducing
gendered norms, it constructs these women as non-women, non-human, monsters in
order to mitigate and nullify the challenge they pose to the motherhood mandate and
appropriate femininity. As such the discursively constructed ‘bad’ woman
reinforces the gendered norms associated with good motherhood and appropriate
femininity, such as care-giving, altruism, and non-violence.
All three of the discursive constructions of the ‘bad’, ‘mad’, and ‘sad’ woman
restrict the portrayal of women who kill their children to that of non-agentic beings.
Indeed, each narrative clearly denies the agency of the female defendant, either by
constructing them as non-human, mythic monsters whose human agency is denied
whilst their non-human monstrous agency is asserted, or as women whose agency is
S. Weare
123
denied because they lack understanding in relation to their actions, or are victims of
their circumstances. Whilst for the ‘mad’ and ‘sad’ woman denials of their agency
may be instrumentally valuable in justifying lenient sentences, such an approach is
pejorative for all women, reinforcing damaging feminine gender stereotypes, and
expectations around the motherhood mandate. For ‘bad’ women whose human
agency is denied, and whose discursively constructed monstrous agency is
acknowledged, there is little expectation of rehabilitation to the status of a human,
let alone a woman, a position which is uniformly damaging. The ‘bad’ woman
narrative identity also reinforces gender stereotypes and agency denials for all
women by suggesting that women are incapable of choosing to kill their child(ren),
unless this choice is directed by mental illness or tragic circumstances (in which
case agency is also denied). What has become abundantly clear is that in the macro-
narratives that emerge ‘nowhere, it seems, is the presentation of a woman who is
both violent and agentic, responsible and human’ [23: 167].
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